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Abstract
On 30 September 2004, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, the Uni-
versity of Nyenrode, and Global Competition Review co-sponsored a seminar on
the reform of Article 82 EC by the European Commission. The seminar raised
a great deal of interest amongst members of the legal community and attracted a
large attendance. The speakers included some of the most well-known top-level
policy makers, academics, and practitioners in the ?eld of competition law. Over
the last two years, there have been numerous calls for modernization of the way
in which Article 82 of the EC Treaty is applied by the European Commission and,
with decentralization in mind, by 25 national competition authorities and many
more national courts. Modernization in other areas has involved a greater focus
on the economic effects of the relevant practice. In Article 82 EC cases, enforce-
ment has, however, been more based on the perceived object of a criticized prac-
tice with the effect being inferred from market power. Classic positions on ?delity
market power. Classic positions on ?delity rebates and the special responsibilities
of dominant companies have also been reaf?rmed recently by the European Court
in judgments such as Michelin II, Masterfoods II, and BA/Virgin. The aim of the
seminar was to look at the concepts underlying the current law in relation to re-
bates and tying and bundling to compare how EU and US enforcers deal with such
issues and to make suggestions for possible European Commission guidelines on
Article 82 EC enforcement practice.
    
OOn 30 September 2004, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, the Univer-sity of Nyenrode, and Global Competition 
Review co-sponsored a seminar on the reform of 
Article 82 EC by the European Commission.  The 
seminar raised a great deal of interest amongst 
members of the legal community and attracted 
a large attendance.  The speakers included some 
of the most well-known top-level policy makers, 
academics, and practitioners in the ﬁeld of com-
petition law.
Over the last two years, there have been 
numerous calls for modernization of the way in 
which Article 82 of the EC Treaty is applied by the 
European Commission and, with decentralization 
in mind, by 25 national competition authorities 
and many more national courts.  Modernization 
in other areas has involved a greater focus on 
the economic effects of the relevant practice.  In 
Article 82 EC cases, enforcement has, however, 
been more based on the perceived object of a 
criticized practice with the effect being inferred 
from market power.  Classic positions on ﬁdelity 
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rebates and the special responsibilities of dominant 
companies have also been reafﬁrmed recently by 
the European Court in judgments such as Michelin 
II, Masterfoods II, and BA/Virgin.  The aim of the 
seminar was to look at the concepts underlying 
the current law in relation to rebates and tying and 
bundling to compare how EU and US enforcers 
deal with such issues and to make suggestions 
for possible European Commission guidelines on 
Article 82 EC enforcement practice.
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (senior counsel, 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) 
introduced the proceedings.  After welcoming all 
the speakers and participants, he drew attention 
to the importance of a reform which, ﬁrst and 
foremost, deﬁnes what is the “object and purpose” 
which Article 82 EC pursues and then sets the rules 
through which this object and purpose is to be 
achieved.  He pleaded for these rules to be based 
on economic effects rather than form and stressed 
that any new guideline on the enforcement of Ar-
ticle 82 EC should provide enforcers, companies, 
and practitioners with a “practicable test.”  Clear 
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objectives and practicable tests do not necessarily 
mean that all per se rules or (rebuttable) presump-
tions should be banned and replaced by economic 
analysis of each individual case. 
The seminar was organized into ﬁve panel 
discussions.
Article 82 EC: 
The Current Law and Practice
In the ﬁrst panel, John Ratliff (partner, Wilmer 
Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) and Derek 
Ridyard (partner, RBB Economics) outlined the 
legal and economic principles underpinning the 
current enforcement of Article 82 EC. 
John Ratliff gave an overview of the legal 
principles and introduced some of the themes 
that would be discussed later in the day, such 
as the (currently) underestimated importance of 
buyer power in assessing dominance and abusive 
conduct; the extreme difﬁculty in distinguishing 
between anti-competitive (exclusionary) practices 
and normal competition; the unsatisfactory ap-
proach to what a dominant ﬁrm can do to respond 
to competitive pressure; and the need to balance 
more economic analysis while not depriving 
companies of predictability and legal certainty. 
He concluded by laying the ground for the discus-
sion on what could be a roadmap for reform.  He 
suggested that the European Commission might 
distinguish between practices which are clearly not 
abusive, practices which are presumptively abu-
sive (e.g. because of market foreclosing effects, 
but which may be allowed if they have proven 
positive effects) and “hardcore” abuses.
Derek Ridyard discussed seven key questions 
which in his opinion should be addressed by the 
European Commission in the reform: “Should 
there be per se abusive practices?”; “Can there 
be an abuse at a threshold below the predation 
standard?”; “What is a cost (or other “objective”) 
justiﬁcation?”; “What is an essential facility?”; 
“When are bundling and tying really abusive?”; 
and “Should economic effects take a role in the 
Commission’s analysis of unilateral conduct?”. 
Some of these questions may currently involve 
conﬂicting answers because the legal standard ap-
plied is sometimes problematic if looked at from 
an economic perspective.  He suggested that the 
reform should rest on two core ideas: no conduct 
should be considered per se abusive and an effects-
based standard should rely on workable economic 
rules of thumb and guidelines.
Rebates after Michelin II 
and BA/Virgin
The second panel was chaired by Michel 
Waelbroeck (Emeritus Professor of European 
Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles and President 
of the Belgian Competition Commission).  He 
opened the discussion on rebates with an overview 
of the case-law of the European courts in this 
area.  He took the view that currently there is very 
little room left for dominant companies wishing 
to implement a rebate scheme and that he did not 
expect the Commission to depart considerably 
from this position, which has been endorsed in its 
entirety by the European courts.
Doug Melamed (partner, Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) discussed the cur-
rent status of the US law on single and bundled 
rebates, stressing the different approach that US 
agencies have to rebates compared to their Eu-
ropean colleagues.  Under US law, he explained 
that single product rebates are not perceived as a 
concern if the price remains above costs.  He then 
discussed the recent judgment in LaPage vs 3M, 
where multi-product discounts were considered 
illegal, even if above costs.  He considered that, 
overall, the opinion in LaPage reﬂected concerns 
that are more common in the EU, such as a sense 
of unfairness when a big or multi-product ﬁrm 
seeks to exploit its advantages to the detriment of 
smaller rivals.
Following on the legal discussion on bundled 
discounts, David Sibley (Deputy Assistant At-
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torney General, Antitrust Division, Department of 
Justice) proposed a test which he thought might 
offer a workable approach to distinguishing com-
petitive from anti-competitive bundled discounts. 
His proposal, which he stressed was not represen-
tative of the DOJ position, was to compare the 
bundled price with the stand-alone price of the 
monopoly product, before the bundling strategy. 
If the stand-alone price of the monopoly product 
equals the monopoly price, consumer welfare of 
the ﬁrm’s customers over both the monopoly prod-
uct and the bundled products is higher than under 
independent pricing.  If the stand-alone price of 
the monopoly product is higher than the monopoly 
price, consumer welfare over all products falls.
Patrick Rey (Professor of Economics, Insti-
tute for Industrial Economics, Toulouse) discussed 
the economic motivations underpinning the policy 
on rebates.  He distinguished between efﬁciency 
motivations and anti-competitive motivations. 
The ﬁrst set of motivations includes so-called 
“Ramsey” pricing (i.e., lowering margins on more 
elastic demand segments), the manufacturer’s goal 
of providing incentives to retailers and the need of 
the manufacturer to meet competition. The second 
set of motivations relates to foreclosure and pre-
dation.  Since some of the rebate schemes may at 
the same time generate efﬁciencies and have some 
foreclosure effect, he suggested that antitrust en-
forcers in Europe should move from a form-based 
to an effect-based approach which is better suited 
to balance the pro- and anti-competitive effects of 
such conduct.  In order to do so, when reviewing 
rebate schemes, antitrust agencies should address 
the following issues: “Has there been an exclusion-
ary effect?”; “Are there signiﬁcant efﬁciencies?”; 
and “Are consumers likely to be harmed?”.
The panel discussion was concluded by Fré-
déric Jenny (Vice-President, French Conseil de 
la Concurrence) who suggested that efﬁciencies 
may not be the only factor that antitrust enforcers 
do (or should) take into consideration when look-
ing at rebates and discounts.  He observed that 
the criticized recent judgments of the European 
courts on rebates may be justiﬁed by the protec-
tion of interests other than an efﬁcient allocation 
of resources.  For instance, antitrust agencies may 
also have an institutional interest in preserving 
equal opportunities to compete for all the market 
players.  He concluded by saying that the political 
framework of any reform of Article 82 EC should 
clarify the factors which should be taken into ac-
count, efﬁciencies being only one of them.
Tying and Bundling – 
from Hilti to Microsoft
The third panel was chaired by Walter van 
Gerven (Emeritus Professor, Katholieke Uni-
versiteit Leuven, former Advocate General at the 
European Court of Justice).  The forum offered 
a lively debate between Alex Burnside (partner, 
Linklaters) and Martin Bechtold (partner, Clif-
ford Chance) on the Microsoft decision, with 
each person advocating one side of the case.  The 
panelists did not contest the appropriateness of 
the test applied by the European Commission in 
ﬁnding an abusive tying by Microsoft, but rather 
focused on whether the decision was sufﬁciently 
grounded on the facts.
The stage was then taken by Barry Nalebuff 
(Adjunct Professor of Law, Yale Law School) who 
gave a presentation on tying and bundling in EC 
and US law.  He pointed out that the enforcement 
of Article 82 EC is much inﬂuenced by the pur-
pose of protecting the market from unfair trading 
practices.  He then discussed the approach of US 
and EC antitrust enforcers towards monopoly 
leveraging, bundling and tying. 
The panel discussion was concluded by a 
presentation from John Thorne (Senior Vice 
President and Deputy General Counsel, Verizon) 
on bundling after the LaPage vs 3M judgment in 
the US.  Mr. Thorne expressed the US industry 
criticisms of the judgment saying it introduced 
uncertainty in this area of law and that this uncer-
tainty could lead to undesired consequences as it 
might deter price cutting through rebates by domi-
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nant ﬁrms.  He suggested that bundled discounts 
should be allowed and that courts should recognize 
that they are not well suited to distinguishing 
beneﬁcial versus anti-competitive bundles, as this 
involves setting and monitoring costs, pricing and 
quantity levels.  On a question from the audience, 
Mr. Thorne also expressed concerns that the legal 
uncertainty on bundled discounts could lead to an 
increase in the number of private actions against 
virtually all American industries as bundled dis-
counts are ubiquitous.
What Scope is there for Modernizing 
Article 82 EC Abuse Practice?
The fourth panel and ﬁrst afternoon session 
was chaired by Sir Christopher Bellamy QC 
(President, UK Competition Appeal Tribunal, 
former judge at the European Court of First In-
stance) who stressed the importance of courts in 
the enforcement of competition rules and that the 
reform of Article 82 EC will have to provide all 
enforcers with a manageable number of clear legal 
rules.  This should not be at the expense of ﬂex-
ibility and coherence with economic concepts.
The ﬁrst two panelists presented their personal 
views on the modernization of Article 82 EC 
from the perspective of the Commission.  Emil 
Paulis (Director, DG Competition, European 
Commission) and Pierre Buigues (Deputy Chief 
Economist, DG Competition, European Commis-
sion) conﬁrmed that the European Commission is 
working on draft guidelines on the enforcement 
of Article 82 EC.  They stated this is a difﬁcult 
and time-consuming process which will concern 
both the concept of dominance and the concept 
of abuse.
The purpose of the guidelines will be to offer 
a comprehensive and systematic approach for 
distinguishing between legal and illegal conduct. 
This has become very important for two reasons: 
facilitating consistency amongst enforcers and 
fostering transparency and legal security for pri-
vate companies.  Mr. Paulis said that the European 
Commission is determined to commit the necessary 
“R&D effort” in this area and is aware that this may 
entail a revision of the European Commission’s 
current approach as also endorsed by the European 
courts.  Mr. Buigues conﬁrmed that the European 
Commission is prepared to move away from a 
legalistic and formalistic approach in favour of en-
forcement based more on economic principles.  This 
means that the focus of enforcement will be on the 
effects and not just on the nature of the conduct.
According to both Mr. Paulis and Mr. Buigues, 
the guiding principles for drafting the guidelines 
will be “consumer welfare” and “competition on the 
merits.” These principles will have to be properly 
deﬁned, but it is already clear that they will not only 
be applicable to dominant ﬁrms but to all players 
equally (i.e., dominant ﬁrms must be allowed to 
compete on the merits, but must also be prevented 
from limiting other ﬁrms’ ability to compete on the 
merits).  It is still an open question if the fact that 
conduct is capable of having exclusionary effects is 
a sufﬁcient standard for ﬁnding an abuse.  Further 
clariﬁcations will be needed in this respect, for 
instance, should the negative effects on consumers 
be actual or just likely and should the competitive 
harm to consumers be direct or does indirect harm 
also sufﬁce.
The Commission will also have to take a posi-
tion on whether its assessment will take account of 
long-term or just short-term considerations.  Mr. 
Buigues added that when assessing the impact of 
conduct on consumers, the Commission may have 
to look at factors other than price and quantity, such 
as product quality and availability.
The guidelines will also touch upon the defenses 
available to dominant ﬁrms.  Both Mr. Paulis and 
Mr. Buigues recognized that efﬁciencies will have to 
be looked at more closely, but admitted that the bal-
ancing of efﬁciencies with the potential exclusion-
ary effects of certain conduct is a difﬁcult task.
To a question by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann on 
how the European Commission sees the allocation 
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of the burden of proof in Article 82 EC cases, Mr. 
Paulis replied that while the European Commission 
will look at each case broadly, it is certainly up to 
the European Commission to provide evidence of 
the exclusionary effects of conduct and up to the 
defendant to provide evidence of the countervail-
ing factors, such as business justiﬁcations and 
efﬁciencies.
Ulf Böge (President, Bundeskartellamt) sug-
gested that the reform of Article 82 EC should 
look at the conduct of companies in light of the 
overall economic context; a test balancing pro- 
and anti-competitive aspects is required although 
this may be difﬁcult in practice.  Already today 
the Bundeskartellamt is frequently engaged in 
examining whether and to what extent efﬁcien-
cies arise from a dominant company’s conduct in 
individual cases.  He concluded that the reform 
should not only introduce more ﬂexible economic 
rules, but should also strive to make abuse control 
predictable and manageable, not least to ensure 
quick proceedings.
William Kolasky (partner, Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) offered his views 
on the notion of competition in the US and how 
it affects enforcement policy against dominant 
companies.  Enforcement in the US is based on 
a few clear principles, including the following: 
government intervention should be extremely 
limited to clearly illegal conduct; rules are not 
meant to protect inefﬁcient competitors; and an-
titrust enforcement should not have the effect of 
stiﬂing incentives to compete and to invest.  In the 
US, two types of conduct are considered abusive: 
predation and exclusionary conduct.  Courts have 
deﬁned very manageable criteria for predation 
based on the comparison of prices with average 
variable costs (AVC): if price is above AVC they 
are per se legal; if they are below AVC, they are 
illegal if recoupment is likely.  As for exclusionary 
conduct, it is abusive if it leads to exclusion of an 
equally efﬁcient competitor and if it is likely to 
harm consumer welfare by sacriﬁcing short term 
proﬁts in order to exclude rivals.
The last panelist, Pieter Kuipers (Deputy 
General Counsel - Europe, Unilever) welcomed 
a review of Article 82 EC that would take into 
account the changes in the economic reality of 
European markets that have occurred since Article 
82 EC was introduced by the Treaty of Rome.  He 
welcomed the fact that, when assessing dominance, 
the European Commission would examine other 
factors such as barriers to entry and not just rely on 
market shares.  He also pleaded in favor of a wider 
recognition of buyer power, particularly at retail 
level, as a factor negating dominance and noted 
that countervailing buyer power has been taken 
into account in many merger control cases.
Closing Remarks and Discussion
The ﬁfth and last panel was chaired by Karel 
van Miert (Chairman of Nyenrode Institute for 
Competition and former European Commissioner 
for Competition) who pleaded in favor of a mod-
ernization of Article 82 EC which would provide 
for “clear and practically enforceable rules.”  He 
agreed that EC competition law should not protect 
inefﬁcient competitors, but added that the great dif-
ferences in the economic structure of European and 
US markets may still justify a different approach to 
abuse of dominance cases in the two jurisdictions. 
In many cases, protecting competitors means pro-
tecting competition (he mentioned in particular the 
newly liberalized markets).  There may be no scope 
for competition at all if small competitors are not 
protected in newly liberalized markets.
John Vickers (Chairman, Ofﬁce of Fair Trad-
ing) observed that the reform of Article 82 EC will 
be challenging because it will have to provide legal 
certainty and introduce economic analysis into this 
area of law.  Those two objectives may not always 
be convergent.  According to Mr. Vickers, a sound 
reform should depart from the current formalistic 
approach, which has proved in many cases to be 
arbitrary and inconsistent.  The reform should be 
based on the acknowledgment that there are no per 
se abuses and that conduct should be reviewed ac-
cording to its economic effects.  However, he was 
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not in favour of an extreme economic approach 
which would deprive companies of clear guidance 
on what is legal and what is illegal conduct.
According to Mr. Vickers, the reform should 
clearly deﬁne the object and purpose of Article 82 
EC and anchor the enforcement policy to those.  He 
then discussed the three principles which have been 
advanced for helping to determine when a domi-
nant ﬁrm’s conduct is unlawfully exclusionary: 
the “sacriﬁce” test (i.e., is the conduct proﬁtable 
but for its tendency to eliminate competition?), 
the “as-efﬁcient competitor” test (i.e., does the 
conduct result in the exclusion of competitors that 
are as efﬁcient as the dominant company?) and 
the “consumer harm” test (i.e., does the conduct 
result in the dominant ﬁrm excluding rivals whose 
presence enhances consumer welfare?).
Alberto Pera (Partner, Gianni Origoni Grippo 
& Partners) concluded the discussion and the 
seminar with the lessons to be learned from the 
reform process that had changed the European 
Commission’s approach to vertical restraints 
under Article 81 EC in recent years.  On that 
occasion, the need for a reform came from the 
“inside”: the European Courts had laid the ground 
for the reform in more than one judgment, many 
NCAs had already embraced the new approach at 
national level, and the business community was 
very much in favor of the reform.  The reform 
of Article 82 EC is very different: the need for 
a reform is coming mainly from the business 
community who has been very critical vis-à-vis 
recent decisions of the European Commission 
that have been endorsed by the European 
Courts.  Regardless of the differences compared 
to the reform on vertical restraints, the current 
reform of Article 82 EC should learn from that 
experience and start the revision process from the 
foundations.  The key issues that will have to be 
tackled include the objectives of Article 82 EC, 
the legal rules for achieving such objectives, and 
the correct standard of proof.  
 
*  *  *
If you have any questions about the reform of 
Article 82 EC, please do not hesitate to contact any 
of the lawyers listed below:
Berlin:
Ulrich Quack
ulrich.quack@wilmerhale.com
Boston:
James C. Burling
james.burling@wilmerhale.com
Brussels:
John Ratliff
john.ratliff@wilmerhale.com
Antonio Capobianco
antonio.capobianco@wilmerhale.com
London:
Suyong Kim
suyong.kim@wilmerhale.com
Washington DC:
William J. Kolasky
william.kolasky@wilmerhale.com
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